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Abstract. The concept of a zero-sum game in Game Theory is
widely studied in fields such as Mathematics and Economics in order to analyze situations and determine optimal courses of actions.
Although a game or situation with fewer decisions can be solved
by hand, we can turn to the Simplex Algorithm to efficiently solve
larger games. This paper examines how the Simplex Algorithm
can be implemented as a linear program in order to solve m × n
zero-sum games.

1. Introduction
Decision making is a process people perform daily albeit 90% of these
decisions are made unconsciously [2]. Decisions that hold significant
consequence often require greater rationale and effort. Game Theory,
the study of strategic decision making, is a prime example of this idea.
John von Neumann originally introduced Game Theory in his 1928
paper On the Theory of Games of Strategy. Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern then expanded upon it with their book Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior in 1944 [3]. A key topic of interest was two-person
zero-sum games, games played by two people where the gains or winnings of one player are directly attributed to the losses of the other
player. A central assumption is that players will act rationally, meaning they will always follow what is mathematically deemed as the “best”
strategy. This paper will refer to the two players in a game as Alice
(she/her) and Bob (he/him).
In this paper, we will examine two-person zero-sum games to discover
the best strategy for each player as well as the outcome when those
strategies are used. In general, a strategy is a course of action or
decisions available to a player during a game. Games can be represented
Date: Spring 2022.
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by a matrix, which holds the strategies available to both players along
with the outcome of a game when players play each of their strategies.
Games represented by small matrices are first introduced along with a
few methods to solve them by hand. Then we introduce the necessary
tools to make the Simplex Algorithm work, and finally discuss the
Simplex Algorithm along with its implementation in Mathematica.
1.1. Definitions and Context. To define the relevant terms and concepts, let us begin with a game called Swords. Suppose on the count
of three Alice and Bob can each choose to show the other person either
1 finger or 2 fingers. If the sum of the shown fingers is even, Bob pays
Alice 1 dollar. If the sum of the shown fingers is odd, Alice pays Bob
1 dollar. This game can be represented in the following matrix:

Alice\Bob 1 Finger 2 Fingers
1 Finger

1

−1

2 Fingers

−1

1

Table 1. The payoff matrix for Swords. Alice is the
row player and Bob is the column player.
Alice and Bob each have two ways to play the game called strategies. They can either show 1 or 2 fingers. We call Alice the row
player, because her strategies are along the left side of the matrix.
Bob is the column player because his strategies are along the top of
the matrix. The numbers in the matrix are called payoffs (and we will
refer to the matrix as a payoff matrix). Payoffs represent the outcome
of a game based on the strategy chosen by each player. We will choose
to think of the payoffs as Alice’s gains and Bob’s losses. To demonstrate, if Alice chooses the strategy to show 1 finger, and Bob chooses
the strategy to show 1 finger, then the result is an even number and
the corresponding payoff of the game is 1. This means Alice gains 1
dollar from Bob or dually that Bob loses 1 dollar to Alice. If Bob had
chosen to show 2 fingers and Alice 1 finger, then Alice gains −1 dollar
and Bob loses −1 dollar. This is a convention nuance for simplicity
in the Simplex Algorithm as we could easily represent the gains and
losses of the players in different ways.
A question that naturally follows is how should Alice and Bob play
each of their available strategies so that both players are playing optimally? That is, Alice is choosing a strategy ensuring she gains as much
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as possible, and Bob chooses a strategy ensuring he loses as little as
possible. This solution for each player is called an optimal strategy.
Recall that we are denoting the payoffs in the matrix to be Alice’s gains
and simultaneously Bob’s losses aligning with the principle of a zerosum game. The optimal strategy for the row player Alice guarantees
a floor on her gains. By playing her optimal strategy, she will always
gain at least the floor value, but can potentially gain more based on
how Bob plays. In a similar manner, Bob’s optimal strategy guarantees a ceiling on his losses. He can lose at most the ceiling value when
playing his optimal strategy, but can potentially lose less based on how
Alice plays. A player’s optimal strategy can either be a pure strategy
or a mixed strategy. A pure strategy is when a player only ever plays
one of their available strategies. A mixed strategy is when a player
plays more than one strategy. Regardless of whether a strategy is pure
or mixed, it can be represented as a vector of probabilities that add up
to 1. For the example in Table 1, the optimal strategy for each player
is to use a mixed strategy, playing their two strategies half the time.
1 1
Therefore the optimal strategy for Alice and Bob is ⟨ , ⟩.
2 2
A solution to a payoff matrix is a triple consisting of the optimal
strategy of the row player, the optimal strategy of the column player,
and the game value, denoted (Ai ,Bj ,V ). The game value is simultaneously the floor of Alice’s gains and the ceiling of Bob’s losses. If
Alice plays her optimal strategy, this is the lowest she can guarantee to
gain with the potential to gain more. If Bob plays his optimal strategy,
this is the most he can expect to lose with the potential to lose less.

2. Solving Smaller Matrices By Hand
2.1. Saddle Point Solutions. Consider the payoff matrix in Table
2. Our goal is to find a solution to the payoff matrix, so optimal
strategies for Alice and Bob, as well as the game value. The simplest
way to determine the game value of the payoff matrix is by determining
if an entry in the payoff matrix is simultaneously the lowest value in
its row and the largest value in its column, known as a saddle point.
If there is a saddle point, the game has what is called a Saddle Point
Solution:
Definition. Let the entry in the ith row and jth column of a game’s
payoff matrix be denoted aij . Suppose there are pure strategies Ah
and Bk in a payoff matrix where the entry ahk is both a least element
in the row Ah and also the greatest element in the column Bk . Then
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the triple (Ah ,Bk ,ahk ) is a solution of the game, where Ah and Bk are
optimal strategies and ahk is the game value.

Alice\Bob
I

I II
3

7

II −1

4

Table 2. A sample 2 × 2 payoff matrix.
To determine if a payoff matrix has a saddle point, we need to find
what is known as the maximin and minimax. The maximin is the
largest value out of the smallest values of each row. The minimax
is the smallest value out of the largest values of each column. If the
maximin and minimax values are the same, then the entry in the matrix
that leads to both is a saddle point.
Alice\Bob
I

I II

Row minimums

3

7

3

II −1

4

−1

Column maximums

3

7 Game Value = 3

Table 3. The minimax (cyan), maximin (orange), and
game value (yellow).
In this example, we find that the value 3 is the maximin and minimax. Therefore the entry in spot a11 of the matrix is a saddle point
and the game value since it is in the row of the maximin and column
of the minimax. By the definition of a saddle point solution, a solution
is (A1 ,B1 ,3). Intuitively, this makes sense for Alice as choosing her
first strategy will always lead to a more favorable outcome than her
second strategy. This is same case for Bob. Finding a Saddle Point
Solution conveniently applies to any size game matrix although it is
more probable to occur in smaller payoff matrices.
2.2. Algorithm to Solve a 2×2 Game. If there are no saddle points,
then for 2×2 games we can turn to an algorithm which derives formulas
to solve for a solution of the matrix.
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q

1−q

Alice\Bob

I

II

Bob’s losses

p

I

a

b

aq + b(1 − q)

1−p

II

c

d

cq + d(1 − q)

5

Alice’s gains ap + c(1 − p) bp + d(1 − p)
Table 4. The probabilities that Alice plays her two
strategies are p and 1-p. For Bob, they are q and 1q.
To begin, consider the payoff matrix in Table 4. We denote the probabilities that Alice plays her strategies in a vector as ⟨p, 1 − p⟩. For
Bob, we denote them as ⟨q, 1 − q⟩. Alice’s gains are along the bottom
of the payoff matrix and Bob’s losses are along the right side of the
payoff matrix. These gains and losses are called marginal values representing what Alice and Bob can expect to gain and lose (respectively)
based on the the other player’s strategies. As an example, the marginal
value ap + c(1 − p) is what Alice can expect to gain against Bob’s first
strategy. It is found by taking the dot product of Alice’s strategies
⟨p, 1 − p⟩ and the values in the first column written as a vector ⟨a, c⟩.
We can use these marginal values to solve for p, 1 − p, q, and 1 − q.
Recall that Alice is trying to find an optimal strategy, and this was
done by finding a floor on her gains. We did this in the previous
section by finding the maximin of the values along the bottom of the
matrix. Alice clearly wants to find the largest floor possible. This
can be accomplished by setting the two marginal values equal to each
other, as the marginal values along the bottom depend on p. The floor
would have to be the smaller of the marginal values when p is plugged
in. This encourages us to set the two marginal values equal, so that
the floor can be as large as possible:
ap + c(1 − p) = bp + d(1 − p)
With some algebra, we can solve for p in terms of a, b, c, and d:
p=

d−c
a−b−c+d

The value 1 − p now comes easily:
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1−p=1−

1−p=

d−c
a−b−c+d

a−b
a−b−c+d

So now we have the probabilities p and 1 − p with which Alice should
play her two strategies based on the entries of the matrix. A similar
process is used to find q and 1 − q by using the marginal values on the
right side of the matrix:
(1)

aq + b(1 − q) = cq + d(1 − q)

q=

(2)

d−b
a−b−c+d

1−q =

a−c
a−b−c+d

For Bob, the motivation for setting the values equal to each other in
equation 1 is swapped from Alice’s as he wants the ceiling on his losses
to be as small as possible. One point of concern is that the equations
for p, 1 − p, q, and 1 − q only hold if a-b-c+d ̸= 0. If it turns out that
a-b-c+d = 0, then we can fortunately see that the matrix has a saddle
point and use the technique in the previous section.
Seen in Table 5, we can now fill in p, 1 − p, q, and 1 − q into the
original payoff matrix, as well as recalculate the marginal values. We
currently have the optimal strategy for Alice (p and 1 − p) and Bob
(q and 1 − q) in the form of a mixed strategy. Since the smallest of
Alice’s gains in the margins is equal to the largest of Bob’s losses in
ad − bc

is simultaneously the floor of Alice’s
the margins, the value
a−b−c+d
gains and ceiling of Bob’s losses, fulfilling the definition of a game value.
Our solution to any 2 × 2 game where a-b-c+d ̸= 0 is then
(⟨

d−c
a−b
d−b
a−c
ad − bc
,
⟩, ⟨
,
⟩,
)
a−b−c+d a−b−c+d a−b−c+d a−b−c+d a−b−c+d
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d−b
a−b−c+d
Alice\Bob
I

a−c
a−b−c+d
II

Bob’s losses

d−c
a−b−c+d

I

a

b

ad − bc
a−b−c+d

a−b
a−b−c+d

II

c

d

ad − bc
a−b−c+d

ad − bc
a−b−c+d

ad − bc
a−b−c+d

ad − bc
a−b−c+d

Alice’s gains

7

Table 5. The updated payoff matrix.
2.3. Graphical Technique to Solve 2×n and n×2 Games. Games
with 2 × 2 payoff matrices are an important foundation of game theory as larger games can sometimes be reduced down to 2 × 2 games.
Consider the payoff matrix in Table 6. In this case, Bob has four pure
strategies to choose from. If we can determine that the optimal strategy for Bob is to mix two of his available four strategies, then we can
reduce the 2 × 4 game into a 2 × 2 game and use the formulas derived
in the previous subsection.

Alice\Bob

q1

q2

q3

q4

I

II

III

IV

Bob’s losses
2q1 − q2 + 3q3 + q4

p

I

2

−1

3

1

1−p

II

−1

4

0

5 −q1 + 4q2 + 0q3 + 5q4

Alice’s gains 2p − 1(1 − p) −p + 4(1 − p) 3p + 0(1 − p) p + 5(1 − p)

Table 6. A sample 2 × 4 payoff matrix.
The optimal strategy for Alice remains finding the floor on her gains.
We will call this value u. Alice’s marginal values (what she can expect
to gain against each of Bob’s strategies) should satisfy the following:
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

2p − 1(1 − p) ≥ u
−p + 4(1 − p) ≥ u
3p + 0(1 − p) ≥ u
p + 5(1 − p) ≥ u
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We can treat the left hand side of each inequality as a function with
respect to p, f(p), and then plot each function as p varies from 0 to
1. This graph be seen in Figure 1. The bold line of Figure 1 is the
floor of Alice’s gains. We can see that the highest point of the bold
line is the intersection of q1 and q2 . This means that Bob playing a
mixed strategy between q1 and q2 will give Alice the largest floor for
her gains as well as satisfy equations 3 through 6. We have learned
from previous examples that finding Alice’s floor will dually find Bob’s
ceiling, so mixing strategies q1 and q2 is optimal for Bob as well. Thus,
we can reduce the original 2 × 4 payoff matrix to a 2 × 2 by keeping the
columns of the 2 × 4 payoff matrix that have strategies q1 and q2 over
it. We can solve the reduced payoff matrix with the formulas from the
previous section. The reduced matrix is seen in Table 7, and solving it
will yield the optimal strategies and game value seen in Table 8.

Figure 1. The graph of Alice’s payoffs against each of
Bob’s pure strategies.
7
An interesting note about Table 8 is that we can see how is the floor
8
or minimum of Alice’s gains in the bottom margin. Alice does have the
7 15
20
potential to gain more than (
and
) if Bob deviates from his
8 8
8
optimal strategy and chooses to play his third
 and fourth strategy. We
5 3 5 3
7
can say our solution for this 2 × 4 game is ⟨ , ⟩, ⟨ , , 0, 0⟩,
. If
8 8 8 8
8
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q1 =
Alice\Bob
5
8
3
1−p=
8

3
5
1−q =
8
8
I
IV

I

2

−1

II

−1

4

Alice’s Gains

7
8

7
8

p=

9

Bob’s Losses
7
8
7
8
7
Game Value =
8

Table 7. A simplified 2 × 2 matrix of the original 2 × 4
game. Notice how the strategies for each player add up
to 1.
q1 =
Alice\Bob

5
3
q2 =
q3 = 0 q4 = 0
8
8
I
II
III
IV

Bob’s losses

p=

5
8

I

2

−1

3

1

7
8

1−p=

3
8

II

−1

4

0

5

7
8

Alice’s gains

7
8

7
8

15
8

7
20
Game Value =
8
8

Table 8. The original 2 × 4 payoff matrix with the optimal strategy filled in.
we were solving for an n × 2 game, then we can use the same graphical
method to solve for the solution. The caveat, however, is that we
would be looking at the ceiling of Bob’s losses, so we would look at the
uppermost lines of the graph and find the lowest point of intersection.
3. Implementation of the Simplex Algorithm
In the next three subsections, we learn how the Simplex Algorithm
is related to linear programs, the concept of pivoting, and the Column
Simplex Method. All are needed to put together the Simplex Algorithm.
3.1. Linear Programs. We currently have techniques to solve 2 × 2
games, 2×n games, n×2 games and any sized game with a Saddle Point
Solution. But now we turn our attention to the Simplex Algorithm in
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order to solve games with larger game matrices (without a Saddle Point
Solution).
The Simplex Algorithm is essentially a technique to solve a linear
program. Linear programming is used in mathematical optimization
when a model’s constraints are represented by linear relationships. Let
us consider the following linear program:
3.1.1. Art Sale. Suppose Alice is planning to sell art. Her two popular
items are paintings and scarfs. She will sell paintings for $5 and scarfs
for $7 and usually makes about $10 in total tips. Paintings take 2 days
to make, while scarfs take 4 days. She only has enough materials to
make 5 total items and 12 days to complete them. We will let x1 represent paintings and x2 scarfs. The linear program can be represented
by the following constraints:
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

x1 ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 ≤ 5
2x1 + 4x2 ≤ 12
u = 5x1 + 7x2 + 10
maximize u

Linear programming aims to optimize (finding the maximum or minimum) what is called an objective function. We are trying to maximize our profit in this example, and our corresponding objective function is u, which is composed of the variables x1 , x2 , and a constant
term. In other words, we are trying to find values for x1 and x2 that
make the equation u as large as possible but at the same time satisfy the other constraints of the program, which in this case are the
constraints 7 through 10.
In order to solve the linear program, we will graph the constraints
which are inequalities. For constraints 9 and 10, we can graph them by
algebraically turning them into a form resembling y=mx + b via treating x1 like x and x2 like y. The graph can be seen in Figure 2. We could
have simply chose x1 to be x and x2 to be y, but the choice of x1 and
x2 will be helpful for later computations. The shaded region of Figure
2 is called the feasible region of the program. The feasible region, its
edges and vertices represent solutions to the program, called feasible
solutions as they satisfy the given constraints. Since our goal is to
maximize u, it is a rule of linear programs that the optimal feasible solution can be found at one of the vertices. With some algebraic checks,
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we can find that the vertex (4,1) yields the maximum value u=37.
Although a graphical approach is fairly straightforward when solving
linear programs, the process can get computationally challenging with
larger programs that can quickly move away from a 2-D feasible region.
This is what motivates the utilization of the Simplex Algorithm as it
can handle higher dimensions while still being efficient.

Figure 2. Graph of linear program with feasible region
shaded.
Let us introduce what are called slack variables to inequalities 9
and 10. What slack variables do is allow us to turn an inequality into an
equation by adding or subtracting a nonnegative variable which equals
out the inequality. In this case, we introduce the slack variables x3 and
x4 .
x1 + x2 + x3 = 5
2x1 + 4x2 + x4 = 12
x3 ≥ 0, x4 ≥ 0
By isolating the slack variables, we can rewrite the linear program
in terms of x1 and x2 :
(12)
(13)
(14)

−x1 − x2 + 5 = x3
−2x1 − 4x2 + 12 = x4
5x1 + 7x2 + 10 = u
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0, x4 ≥ 0
maximize u
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Here we can set x1 = 0 and x2 = 0 and easily find the values of
the slack variables as well as u. By doing so, we see that x1 = 0
and x2 = 0 is a feasible solution to the program which we can write
as (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ,x4 ) = (0,0,5,12) and u = 10. The slack variables don’t
contribute to the answer for the linear program as we only require the
variables we started with, but we will continue to include them and
their values. A slack variable that equals 0 indicates that the inequality
constraint is at its limit (an edge of the feasible region) [1].
Although the solution when x1 =0 and x2 =0 is feasible, it is not optimal. We can build on the idea of plugging in 0 for two of the variables
and solving for the other two, by making it so the values to become
0 are independent variables. That is, the values to become 0 are
collected on one side of the equation, and the dependent variable is
on the other side, determined by altering the values of the independent
variables. In this example, if we want x2 =0 and x3 =0, then x2 and
x3 are our independent variables which we want to move to the left
hand side in each of the equations, leaving x1 and x4 to be dependent
variables on the right hand side in their respective equation. Observing equation 12, we see x2 is already on the left hand side. All that is
needed is to algebraically swap x1 and x3 and then substitute x1 , which
should now be isolated on the right hand side, into the other equations:
−x2 − x3 + 5 = x1
−2x2 + 2x3 + 2 = x4
2x2 − 5x3 + 35 = u
Now if we let x2 =0 and x3 =0, we get (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ,x4 ) = (5,0,0,2) and u
= 35 which is another feasible solution. All combinations of setting two
out of the four variables (although note that there are much more combinations in larger systems) equal to 0 essentially traverses the vertices
of the feasible region where we can then determine the maximum value.
This process of solving for a variable and plugging it into the rest of the
program, is called an exchange operation as we just exchanged the
roles of x1 and x3 . We could continue with exchange operations and
eventually determine a feasible solution which finds the max value of u.
However, exchange operations can be represented in a more eloquent
way which will assist with the Simplex Algorithm.
3.2. Pivoting. Let us look at equations 12, 13, and 14, the equations
from the program in the last section:
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−x1 − x2 + 5 = x3
−2x1 − 4x2 + 12 = x4
5x1 + 7x2 + 10 = u
Consider Table 9 where we rewrite these equations in a column form.
This representation of the program is called a column program where
the independent variables are along the left side while the dependent
(slack) variables are along the bottom.

x1

−1*

−2

5

x2

−1

−4

7

1

5

12

10

= x3 = x4 = u
Table 9. The equations written vertically as a matrix
with the independent variables in the left column and
the dependent variables along the bottom.
If we wanted to repeat the exchange operation as we did in the
previous subsection where we solved to have x2 and x3 as independent
variables on the left hand side, we can utilize Table 9 to algorithmically
do the computations, with a technique called pivoting. We first need
to identify the pivot element in the matrix. Since we want to have
x2 and x3 as independent variables, and x2 is already an independent
variable, we want to swap the variables x1 and x3 . Thus, our pivot
element will be the element in the same row as x1 and column as x3 ,
so −1 which is starred in Table 9. The algorithm for pivoting is as
follows:
(1) Replace the nonzero pivot with its reciprocal
(2) Divide all other elements in the pivot’s row by the pivot element
(3) Divide all other elements in the pivot’s column by the pivot
element and then change the sign
(4) For any other element, subtract the element by the product of
the element in the same column that is in the pivot’s row, the
element in the same row that is in the pivot’s column, and the
reciprocal of the pivot element

14
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(5) For the variable in the side margin in the same row as the pivot
element, swap it with the variable in the bottom margin in the
same column as the pivot element

x1

a*

b

c

x2

d

e

f

1

g

h

i

x3

1
a

x2

−d
a

= x1

Table
10. A
generalized version of Table 9
with the pivot
element starred.

e-

1
c

bd
cd
f a
a

−g
bg
ha
a

1

= x3 = x4 = u

1
b

i-

= x4

cg
a

=u

Table 11. The
new matrix after the pivot algorithm is applied.

Tables 10 and 11 illustrate pivoting on a generalized matrix. A
subtlety of the algorithm is that each step is performed on the original
matrix. As an example, you perform Step 1 on Table 10, then Step
2 on Table 10, etc. You do not perform Step 1 on Table 10 and then
perform Step 2 on the result of Step 1. Table 12 shows the result after
we pivot on the starred element in Table 9.
x3

−1

2

−5

x2

−1

−2

2

1

5

2

35

= x1 = x4 = u
Table 12. The resulting column program after pivoting. Notice how x1 and x3 are swapped from Table 9.
We will call the highlighted row the distinguished row and the
highlighted column the distinguished column. We use the term distinguished to recognize that we do not want to pivot on these elements
for computational reasons of the Simplex Algorithm. We define a column program as column feasible if all entries in the distinguished
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row are nonnegative. Thus, Table 12 is column feasible. As the term
feasible suggests, when the matrix is column feasible, it is expressing
a feasible solution. In Table 12, (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ,x4 ) = (5,0,0,2) and u = 35
which is what we saw in the previous subsection.
3.3. Column Simplex Method and Duality. In subsection 3.2, we
determined that Table 12 exhibited a column feasible solution. However, we know from subsection 3.1 that the maximum value is u = 37.
Using the Column Simplex Method, we can start with the column
feasible solution from Table 12 and selectively pivot in order to obtain the optimal feasible solution. The Column Simplex Method is as
follows:
(1) Start with a column feasible schema. That is, a column program
with all entries in the distinguished row that are nonnegative.
(2) If all entries in the distinguished column are nonpositive (row
feasible), then the column program exhibits the optimal feasible solution. If this is not true, move on to Step 3.
(3) Without loss of generality, choose a positive element in the
distinguished column. We will denote this element with the
dummy variable c.
(4) Find all negative elements that are in the same row as c (if
there are no negative elements in the same row as c, then the
program is unbounded meaning there is no optimal solution).
For each of these elements, compute ratios by dividing each
negative element from the element in the distinguished row that
shares the same column.
(5) Select the element that yields the largest ratio (the ratio closest
to 0 on a number line). We will denote this element p.
(6) Pivot using the p as the pivot element. Then go back to Step
2.
As an example, we will use the Column Simplex Method on Table
12:
• We are starting with the column feasible program from Table
12
• The element 2 in the distinguished column is the only nonnegative element, so that is our choice for c
• Both elements in the same row as 2 are negative. The ratio for
5
2
the first column is
. The ratio for the second column is
−1
−2
5
2
•
<
so our choice for p is the element −2
−1
−2

16
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• Our pivot element p = −2 is in the second row of the second
column, and Table 13 shows the result of the pivot

x3
x4
1

−2
1
2

1
−1
2

−3

4

1

37

−1

= x1 = x2 = u
Table 13. The column program after pivoting from Table 12 on pivot element -2.
By Step 2 of the Column Simplex Method, we can see that elements
in the distinguished column are nonpositive so we have reached the
optimal feasible solution which is exactly what we saw in subsection
3.1 where ⟨x1 , x2 ⟩ = ⟨4, 1⟩ on the feasible region in Figure 2 and u =
37. Notice that in subsection 3.2, we essentially performed our first
iteration of the Column Simplex Method with the element in the top
left corner acting as the pivot element.
Recall that what we just solved for was the linear program from subsection 3.1 where we were to maximize the objective function. This
translates to how Alice wants to maximize the floor of her gains so we
set up a linear program for her and maximized her floor. In a similar
manner, we can set up the linear program to minimize the objective
function, translating to how Bob wants to minimize the ceiling of his
losses. In the next subsection, we will see how we can set up linear
programs for Alice and Bob, but the two programs can be represented
by the same matrix. By solving this shared matrix, we are simultaneously solving both programs, the essence of dual linear programming
or duality.
3.4. Simplex Algorithm. The Simplex Algorithm puts together tools
from the previous subsections which allows us to solve any sized payoff
matrix. Let us assemble them with an example:
3.4.1. Penalty Kicks. Suppose Alice and Bob are doing penalty kicks
in soccer. Alice will kick 5 times while Bob tries to defend them. Alice
can either choose to kick to the right side of the goal, left side of the
goal, or kick down the middle. Similarly, Bob can defend to the right,
left, or middle part the goal. Assume that right, left, and middle part
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of the goal is same for the kicker and goalie. Intuitively, when Alice
kicks away from where Bob defends, she will receive a favorable chance
of scoring. But Bob will receive a favorable chance of blocking the kick
if he correctly defends where Alice kicks. We can see these payoffs in
Table 14.

y4

y5

y6

Alice\Bob

R

L

M

x1

R

4

−3

2

x2

L −4

5

0

2

−2

x3 M

3

Table 14. Payoff matrix for Penalty Kicks where Alice
is the row player and Bob is the column player.

We strategically denote Bob’s pure strategies as ⟨y4 , y5 , y6 ⟩ to setup
the Simplex Algorithm. Now we can set up our linear program for
Alice and Bob:
Alice:

Bob:

x 1 + x2 + x3 = 1
4x1 − 4x2 + 3x3 ≥ u
−3x1 + 5x2 + 2x3 ≥ u
2x1 + 0x2 − 2x3 ≥ u
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
maximize u

y4 + y5 + y6 = 1
4y4 − 3y5 + 2y6 ≤ v
−4y4 + 5y5 + 0y6 ≤ v
3y4 + 2y5 − 2y6 ≤ v
y4 ≥ 0, y5 ≥ 0, y6 ≥ 0
minimize v

Keep in mind that for the left side of the inequalities in Bob’s programs, you take the dot product of his strategies ⟨y4 , y5 , y6 ⟩ and each
row of the payoff matrix. And because we are trying to minimize Bob’s
ceiling, the inequalities are less than or equal to v, which is what we
will denote as the ceiling of Bob’s losses. We can introduce slack variables to the inequalities of each program:
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Alice

Bob

4x1 − 4x2 + 3x3 − x4 = u
−3x1 + 5x2 + 2x3 − x5 = u
2x1 + 0x2 − 2x3 − x6 = u
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
x4 ≥ 0, x5 ≥ 0, x6 ≥ 0

4y4 − 3y5 + 2y6 + y1
−4y4 + 5y5 + 0y6 + y2
3y4 + 2y5 − 2y6 + y3
y4 ≥ 0, y5 ≥ 0, y6
y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0, y3

=v
=v
=v
≥0
≥0

Notice that for Alice’s program, we subtract the slack variables since
we need to reduce the value of the left hand side of the inequality to
make equations. We will rewrite the programs with the slack variables
as dependent variables:
Alice

Bob

x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
4x1 − 4x2 + 3x3 − u = x4
−3x1 + 5x2 + 2x3 − u = x5
2x1 + 0x2 − 2x3 − u = x6
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
x4 ≥ 0, x5 ≥ 0, x6 ≥ 0
maximize u

y4 + y5 + y6 = 1
4y4 − 3y5 + 2y6 − v = −y1
−4y4 + 5y5 + 0y6 − v = −y2
3y4 + 2y5 − 2y6 − v = −y3
y4 ≥ 0, y5 ≥ 0, y6 ≥ 0
y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0, y3 ≥ 0
minimize v

At this point, we could set up a column program for Alice and a
row program for Bob. The schematic of a row program with two
inequality constraints is shown in Table 15. In duality to column programs, row programs can be row feasible where all elements in the
distinguished column are nonpositive (except for possibly the bottom
element). There is also a Row Simplex Method to use if the row
program is row feasible. However, the magic of duality allows us to
only have to use either the Column Simplex Method or Row Simplex
Method, as they both lead us to the same result. We will choose to use
the Column Simplex Method.
We will now represent Alice’s column program (and simultaneously
Bob’s row program) in a schematic form introduced by mathematician
A.W. Tucker [4]. It is shown in Table 16. Notice that the highlighted
partition is just the original game matrix! Thus, when the Simplex
Algorithm is given a game matrix, the game matrix goes in the middle
and the appropriate number of 1’s and −1’s are added to the margins
along with the appropriate number of variables. Towards the end of
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y3 y4 1
a

d

g = −y1

b

e

h = −y2

c

f

i

=v

Table 15. Schematic for a row program. Later we will
swap independent and dependent variables. Variables
swapped to the top turn positive while variables swapped
to the right turn negative.
subsection 3.3, it is discussed how the programs created by the constraints of each player can be represented by the same matrix. That
matrix is exactly Table 16! The coefficients for Alice’s program are
written as columns with the variables representing Alice’s strategy on
the left margin and the slack variables along the bottom margin. The
coefficients for Bob’s program are written as rows with the variables
representing Bob’s strategy along the top margin and the slack variables on the right margin.
−v

y4

y5

y6

u

0

−1

−1

−1

x1

1

4

−3

2 = −y1

x2

1

−4

5

0 = −y2

x3

1

3

2

−2 = −y3

= −1

= 1 = x4 = x5 = x6
Table 16. A.W. Tucker’s schematic form to set up the
Simplex Algorithm. Highlighted in cyan is the original
payoff matrix.
The Simplex Algorithm now wants us to pivot on the bottom left
corner of the schematic form (Table 17) and then pivot on the top right
corner (Table 18). After the two pivots, we can redraw the dashed
lines to get the highlighted distinguished row and column in Table
19. It is at this point in the Simplex Algorithm that the program
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will either be column feasible or row feasible. Since the elements in
the distinguished row are all nonnegative, the highlighted partition is
column feasible, and we can use the Column Simplex Method until
all the elements in the distinguished column are nonpositive. In other
words, we have found the optimal solution when the program is column
and row feasible.
−v

y4

y5

y6

u

0

−1

−1

−1

x1

1

4

−3

2 = −y1

x2

1

−4

5

0 = −y2

x3

1*

3

2

−2 = −y3

= −1

= 1 = x4 = x5 = x6
Table 17. Begin by pivoting on the bottom left corner.

y3

y4

y5

y6

u

0

−1

−1

−1*

x1

−1

1

−5

4 = −y1

x2

−1

−7

3

2 = −y2

1

1

3

2

−2

= −1

=v

= x3 = x4 = x5 = x6
Table 18. The result of the first pivot. Now we must
pivot on the top right corner.
It is not by coincidence that this example yielded a column feasible
program (seen in Table 19). It is a result of the fact that element in the
bottom right corner of the original payoff matrix was the the smallest
element in its row. If we wanted the program to be row feasible after
the two pivots (and hence use the Row Simplex Method), then the
element in the bottom right corner of the original matrix needs to be
the largest element in its column.
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y3

y4

y5

1

x6

0

1

1

−1 = −y6

x1

−1

−3

−9

4 = −y1

x2

−1

−9

1

2 = −y2

1

1

5

4

−2

=v

= x3 = x4 = x5 = u
Table 19. The result of the second pivot.
Let us continue with the example:
• We need to find the the pivot element of the program in Table
19. The Column Simplex Method says to pick a nonnegative
element, so we can choose c = 4 or c = 2. We will end up at
the same answer either way, so we will choose c = 4
• All elements in the same row as c = 4 are negative, so all
5
<
columns are being considered in the ratio comparison.
−3
1
4
<
. So we will pivot on the third column, and our pivot
−1
−9
element will be p = −9. The result of pivoting is shown in Table
20
• Looking at Table 20, there is still one more value in the distinguished column that has a nonnegative value, so we will perform
22
another iteration Column Simplex Method with c = . There
9
are only two negative elements in the same row as c. Compar−5
−11
−28
ing the ratios, we have
<
. So p =
. The result of
10
28
3
pivoting is shown in Table 21
Looking at Table 21, all values in the distinguished row are nonnegative, and all values in the distinguished column are nonpositive.
Since the program is now column and row feasible, we have reached the
optimal solution. All variables along the left and top are independent
variables, so recall from subsection 3.1 that they equal 0.
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y3

y4

y1

1

x6

−1
9

2
3

1
9

−5
= −y6
9

x5

1
9

1
3

−1
9

−4
= −y5
9

x2

−10
9

−28
3

1
9

22
= −y2
9

1

5
9

11
3

4
9

−2
9

=v

= x3 = x4 = x1 = u
Table 20. The result after pivoting on p = −9.
Here are the optimal strategies for Alice and Bob:
41 11 5
, , , 0, 0, 0⟩ and u =
84 28 42
11 5 8
Bob: ⟨y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 , y6 ⟩ = ⟨0, 0, 0, , , ⟩ and u =
42 14 21

Alice: ⟨x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 , x6 ⟩ = ⟨

31
42
31
42

The values are rewritten in terms of the original matrix in Table 22.
In the context of the 5 penalty kicks, Alice should kick to the right
5(0.49) ≈ 2 times, to the left 5(0.39) ≈ 2 times, and the middle 5(0.12)
≈ 1 time. It does not matter what order Alice kicks in, as long as
she follows the number of kicks per direction, she is playing optimally.
Bob should defend to the right 5(0.26) ≈ 1 time, to the left 5(0.36)
≈ 2 times, and the middle 5(0.38) ≈ 2 times. In a similar fashion, it
does not matter what order Bob defends in, as long as he follows the
number of dives per direction, he is playing optimally. The game value
is about 0.74, so 0.74 is the floor of Alice’s gains and ceiling of Bob’s
losses. Along the bottom edge, we can see the game value or a value
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y3

y2

y1

1

x6

−4
21

1
14

5
42

−8
= −y6
21

x5

1
14

1
28

−3
28

−5
= −y5
14

x4

5
42

−3
28

−1
84

−11
= −y4
42

1

5
42

11
28

41
84

31
42

= x3 = x 2 = x1

=u

=v

Table 21. The result after pivoting on p =

−28
.
3

Alice\Bob y4 = 0.26 y5 = 0.36 y6 = 0.38 Bob’s Losses
x1 = 0.49

4

−3

2

0.74

x2 = 0.39

−4

5

0

0.74

x3 = 0.12

3

2

−2

0.74

Alice’s Gains

0.74

0.74

0.74

V = 0.74

Table 22. The Penalty Kicks payoff matrix with the
probabilities that each player should play with and the
marginal values.
higher than the game value, because the game value is the best Alice
can guarantee for herself, but she has the potential to gain more as we
saw in subsection 2.3. Along the right edge, we can see the game value
or a value lower than the game value, because the game value is the
guaranteed worst that Bob can lose, but he has the potential to lose
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less if he plays optimally. In this case, however, 0.74 is lowest Alice can
expect to gain and the highest Bob can expect to lose.
Something to note about the optimal strategies for each player is that
it does not matter if we played 5 games (like we did for Penalty Kicks),
10 games, or 100 games. The optimal strategies represent probabilities
(proportions) of the time a player should play each strategy. If we
were to do 100 penalty kicks and each kick is represented by the payoff
matrix in Table 22, then Alice can determine how many times to kick
right by taking 100(0.49) = 49 kicks, kick left by taking 100(0.39) =
39 kicks, and kick to the middle by taking 100(0.12) = 12 kicks. The
same can be found for Bob.
To summarize the Simplex Algorithm:
(1) Given a game matrix, label it with variables representing the
strategies for the row and column player. Check the bottom
row to see if the element in the right corner is a row minimum.
If it is, move to the next step. If it is not, find the column that
has the the row minimum for the bottom row and swap that
column with the last column. Be sure to swap the corresponding
variables if you do so. Then move to the next step.
(2) Put the game matrix into A.W. Tucker’s schematic form.
(3) Pivot on the bottom left corner.
(4) Pivot on the top right corner.
(5) As a consequence of the bottom right corner being a row minimum, the program will be column feasible. If it also row feasible, move to the next step. If not, iteratively use the Column
Simplex Method until the program is column and row feasible.
Then move to the next step.
(6) Interpret the results by rewriting the probabilities in the original
game matrix.

3.5. Simplex Algorithm Implementation in Mathematica. With
assistance from David Roberts, I implemented the Simplex Algorithm
in the Mathematica software. All that is needed is to input a matrix
into the function simplexAlgorithm[matrix_] and the solution of the
game is returned.
As an example, consider the game matrix from subsection 3.4 and
the result when put into the function simplexAlgorithm[matrix_]:
{GameValue=31/42, p_1=41/84, p_2=41/84, p_3=5/42,
q_1=11/42, q_2=5/14, q_3=8/21}. This is exactly the result we
previously calculated!
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The function simplexAlgorithm[matrix_] has various helper functions to incorporate all the sub algorithms and computations covered
in this paper:
(1) The input matrix is passed as input to a function called
alterMatrix[matrix_]. It creates the variables representing
the strategies for each player as well as slack variables. Then it
checks to see if the bottom right corner of the game matrix is a
row minimum. If it already is, then it outputs the matrix and
all the variables as a pair. If not, then it swaps the last column
of the matrix with the column holding the smallest element in
the bottom row. Then it outputs the aforementioned pair
(2) The pair from the output of alterMatrix[matrix_] is passed
into the function initialize[pair_]. This function takes
the matrix from the pair and converts it into A.W. Tucker’s
schematic form. Then it does a pivot on the bottom left corner,
and the top right corner which sets us up to use the Column
Simplex Method. The variables are also swapped accordingly,
then the new matrix and shuffled variables are output as a pair
(3) The pair from the output of initialize[pair_] is passed into
the function columnSimplex[pair_]. This function takes the
matrix from the pair and sees if all elements in the distinguished
column are nonpositive (row feasible). If it is not, it recursively
performs the Column Simplex Method until the matrix is row
feasible. During each iteration of the Column Simplex Method,
the variables are swapped accordingly as pivoting is required.
When the matrix finally reaches row feasibility, it and the further shuffled variables are output as a pair
(4) The rest of the function simplexAlgorithm[pair_] then uses
the output pair of matrix and variables to return to the user
the game value and optimal strategies for each player
Before implementing the Simplex Algorithm, I had previously implemented the Shapley-Snow Algorithm in Mathematica. It is another
technique used to solve two player zero sum matrix games, but it is far
less efficient. It is a known fact of game theory that optimal strategies
involve the same number of strategies for both players. As an example,
if we consider a 5 × 7 matrix game and the optimal strategy for Alice
uses three of her strategies, then Bob’s optimal strategy also uses three
of his strategies. Based on this, we can assume that the optimal strategy for each player can have up to five strategies. My Shapely-Snow
implementation looks at the case when each player uses 5 strategies
and sees if the optimal strategy exists there. If not, then it moves on
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to when each player uses 4 strategies, then 3 strategies, etc. until it
finds the optimal strategy. This idea of a blind search is vastly inefficient, and it motivates us to utilize the algorithmic approach of the
Simplex Algorithm.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen how we can solve two person zero sum
games by hand and with the Simplex Algorithm. The Simplex Algorithm is an especially nifty technique compared to others such as the
Shapley-Snow Algorithm (or even just solving by hand) because of its
efficiency. Its utilization continues to be widely popular in Mathematics, Economics, and decision-making.
Despite its usefulness, there are still some drawbacks and limitations
to be explored. The most pressing issue in my research of the Simplex
Algorithms are ties in the game matrix, when the same row or column
shared the same value. When there were ties, sometimes I ran into computational errors in Mathematica, so that is an area of concern to be
addressed. Another point of interest are the limitations of Mathematica’s computational ability. After enlarging Mathematica’s recursion
limit, I found that the implementation was able to solve a 100 × 100
matrix game in about 10 minutes, which is the largest payoff matrix I
have tested. Undoubtedly, there is more than one way to implement
the Simplex Algorithm, with some being more efficient than others.
However, the notion of constrained size and computational power is
still seemingly a barrier to be overcome.
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